The Meccan Alliance as a Response to Strategic Challenges and Threats

As the post-1991 US security architecture in the Middle East undergoes political transformation in the wake of region-wide hostilities with Iran, regional states are coming forward with security initiatives of their own. The brand-new Meccan Alliance and its implications are explored by Kamran Gasanov, Senior Lecturer at RUDN University.

The Meccan Alliance: Building a Security Architecture Atop Ruins of Old Order

While the major players are locked in their own contests—the US with China, Russia with Europe—the middle powers fear becoming hostages to this struggle and are building alternative security systems. A telling example is the region that Zbigniew Brzezinski called the Global Balkans. Following Operation Desert Storm, the US served as the principal guarantor of security here. However, the destruction of Iraq and the rise of Iran shifted the balance of power, undermining the dominance of both Washington and its key ally—Israel.

The thirty–year struggle against Iran’s Axis of Resistance in Lebanon, Palestine, Yemen, Syria, and Iraq reached its climax in 2024–2026. Iran and Israel exchanged direct strikes for the first time, after which the US joined the conflict during the Twelve–Day War and Operation Epic Fury. These events finally shattered what remained of the security system built on the American military presence stretching from Turkey and Jordan to Qatar and the UAE.

The US Is No Longer a Guarantor of Security

Neither the Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia and Al Udeid Air Base in Qatar, nor the US Fifth Fleet’s base in Bahrain, nor NATO membership have proved a deterrent against Iranian and Houthi attacks on oil refineries, LNG facilities, and ports across the Gulf states, as well as on Turkish territory. On the contrary, American military infrastructure turns these states into potential targets for Iran and its allies. Beyond the US and Iran, there is also an Israeli factor: in hunting down Hamas members, Israeli aircraft are not confining themselves to Gaza and Iran, and stand ready to strike even Qatar.

Although Trump announced a ceasefire with Iran in April, it has been broken repeatedly. There is neither a stable lull in hostilities nor any progress in negotiations. The absence of a compromise over the status of the Strait of Hormuz, together with the approaching Knesset elections—in which Benjamin Netanyahu may once again play the external–threat card—raises the likelihood of a major escalation. This is why the countries of the region have decided not to wait for a new nuclear deal or a new war, and are instead building their own security system.

On 7 August, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met in Mecca and signed a joint defence agreement. On paper, its obligations resemble NATO’s Article 5: an attack on one country is treated as an attack on all. At the same time, the alliance does not override its members’ existing commitments—Turkey remains a NATO member, Pakistan has arrangements with China, and Saudi Arabia holds the status of a Major Non–NATO Ally of the US.

The agreement provides for “further strengthening their collective security”. Yet as it expands, the Meccan bloc may start to compete with—or even supplant—other military commitments. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan is already inviting Egypt to join the alliance. This would come as no surprise: after the April truce between Iran, the US, and Israel, a forum was held in Antalya at which the foreign ministers of Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan discussed regional security and a possible military alliance.

Failed Attempts to Create a Middle Eastern NATO

The emergence of the Meccan agreement owes a great deal to the failure of earlier initiatives. In 2015, at the Sharm el–Sheikh summit, Arab states attempted to create an Arab NATO. But rivalry for leadership, reluctance to accept Egypt’s leading role, conflicts in Yemen, Syria, and Libya, and the 2017 blockade of Qatar derailed the project.

A second attempt was made by Trump during his first presidential term. A Middle East NATO was meant to isolate Iran through the Abraham Accords—the normalisation of relations between Arab states and Israel. Morocco, Sudan, Bahrain, and the UAE signed up, but none of them was in any hurry to form a military alliance with Israel. Saudi Arabia was unwilling to recognise the Jewish state because of the Palestinian question. Furthermore, in March 2023, Iran and Saudi Arabia restored diplomatic relations through Chinese mediation, and the US operation in Iran further discredited the idea of such a bloc.

A third initiative came from Netanyahu, who likewise proposed a regional NATO equivalent to counter Iran. But the Israeli prime minister had even fewer resources to draw on. The mass bombing of Gaza, operations in Lebanon and against Iran, the elimination of Hamas leaders in Qatar, and harsh rhetoric directed at Turkey convinced many states in the region that Israel was hardly a guarantor of their security. States that had not recognised Israel abandoned any plans to join the Abraham Accords, while some of those that had already recognised it began scaling back relations with Tel Aviv.

The Individual Interests of the Meccan Union’s Members

Arab disunity, the US and Israeli reliance on military operations, and the incompatibility of Iran’s Axis of Resistance regional project with the interests of the other states all led to the creation of the alliance between Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan. Its obligations, however, are limited. First, the treaty does not require immediate military intervention: a country under attack may request assistance ranging from intelligence and logistics to weapons and the deployment of troops. Second, as Fidan noted, there is no shared written definition of what constitutes a threat. This means each country joined the alliance to neutralise its own particular risks, even though some of those risks overlap.

The most vulnerable of the three is Saudi Arabia. It has neither a powerful army like Turkey’s nor a nuclear cudgel like Pakistan’s. Iranian missiles and drones will continue to threaten the kingdom’s oil infrastructure. The Houthis also pose a long–term risk: the Ansar Allah movement has resumed strikes on Saudi Arabia, hitting the country’s second–largest refinery at Jizan and the Red Sea port of Yanbu. Iran is capable of closing off oil exports through the Strait of Hormuz, while the Houthis can do the same through the Bab–el–Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal.

The foundation of the Meccan agreement was the Saudi–Pakistani alliance: the two countries signed a mutual defence pact back in September of last year. Although it did not stop Iranian attacks on Saudi territory, the two states have been deepening their military cooperation. In May, Islamabad sent 8,000 troops to the kingdom, along with a squadron of JF–17 fighter jets, two drone squadrons, and Chinese HQ–9 air defence systems.

Turkey and Pakistan are less frequently subject to direct external aggression, but they too have an interest in the pact. During the spring war, at least four missiles were launched from Iranian territory. The incident did not trigger an escalation between Ankara and Tehran, though Turkey did pass a warning on to Iran. Ankara is concerned about Kurdish militants (the PKK), the prospect of a more active Iranian Kurdish movement (PJAK), and Israel’s alliance with Greece and Cyprus. Turkish interests clash with Israeli ones in Syria, Palestine, and potentially Lebanon; with Greece in the Aegean Sea; and with Cyprus over the Turkish Cypriots and offshore gas fields.

Pakistan occupies a privileged position within the alliance. It has long–standing ties with both Turkey and Saudi Arabia, whereas Ankara and Riyadh were, until fairly recently, rivals: Turkey backed Qatar during the blockade, while Saudi Arabia backed General Haftar in Libya and the forces opposed to Mohamed Morsi in Egypt. Relations were normalised in 2022, following reciprocal visits by Erdoğan and Mohammed bin Salman.

Pakistan has an enormous population, hosts no foreign military bases on its territory, and possesses a nuclear arsenal that ranks seventh in the world. Saudi financing, for its part, is important for joint exercises and the production of modern weaponry. The alliance with Ankara gives Islamabad access to Turkish technology—from Bayraktar drones to the KAAN fifth–generation fighter jet. At the same time, the risks of separatism (the Baloch), border disputes with India and Afghanistan, and the activity of terrorist cells all make reliable allies a necessity.

Is There a Common Enemy?

As the Turkish minister noted, common threats are indeed not spelled out in the pact. Their absence can be explained by diplomatic and political considerations. Although all three countries understand that the US is destabilising the region through its own actions, Washington remains an important partner for them, in everything from investment to the military sphere. The situation with Iran is much the same. Whereas Saudi Arabia can afford to make harsh statements against the Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan and Turkey are important economic partners of Tehran.

Nevertheless, it can be said that the alliance of Turkey, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia is a response to several strategic challenges and threats. The first is Israel. Pakistan is its ideological opponent because of its solidarity with Palestine, Turkey is its geopolitical rival in the Levant, and Saudi Arabia is becoming a victim of the IDF’s military undertakings against Iran. Looking ahead, every player in the region understands that if Iran is brought to its knees, Israel will become a superpower that will need to be balanced—and the US will be of no help here. The second threat is linked to the alliance between Israel, the Greeks, India, and the UAE, whose prototype is the I2U2 grouping. India poses the same kind of danger to Pakistan that Israel poses to Turkey. New Delhi and Ankara are locked in much the same cold war as Tel Aviv and Islamabad are over Gaza—India, for instance, blocks Turkey’s entry into BRICS and supplies weapons to Armenia. Recently, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been mounting over Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan, where the Emiratis are leaning towards an alliance with Israel, meaning that for the Saudis, the alliance with the Turks and Pakistanis offers a way to contain the UAE–Israel bloc.

The third geopolitical motive may be linked to the US. The White House, whether under the Democrats or under Trump, periodically demonstrates its own unreliability. Military action against Iran causes no less concern than the constant criticism of human rights and the state of democracy. For example, whenever the interests of other states clash with Israel’s, the US often gives Israel priority—the demand that Saudi Arabia recognise Israel in exchange for nuclear cooperation illustrates this logic perfectly. Turkey may be a NATO member, but should it find itself in direct conflict with Israel, it is unlikely that the US would take its ally’s side. A fourth threat common to all three is separatism and domestic discontent, embodied by the Turkish Kurds, Pakistan’s Baloch, and Saudi Arabia’s Shia.

As for Russia’s interests, given that it currently has no direct conflicts with any member of the alliance, and instead enjoys close cooperation across a range of areas—from energy to membership of the SCO and BRICS—Moscow has nothing to worry about in the short term. Russia has managed to maintain a balance in its relations with all of these countries, even amid serious tensions between them, and since the fall of Assad in Syria, Russia has not been drawn into regional score–settling. Were Moscow to feature at all on the list of the Meccan alliance’s potential common threats, it would trail far behind Israel, Iran, the US, separatism, and the region’s radical and extremist movements.