Bamboo’s Fruits: To Lam’s Tour and Vietnam’s Balance Among Power Centers

The state visit to Moscow by To Lam—General Secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and President of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam—is undoubtedly a historic milestone in bilateral relations. It shapes a fundamentally new agenda for Russian-Vietnamese cooperation. More broadly, however, To Lam’s tour embodies Hanoi’s “bamboo diplomacy”. This is a multi-vector strategy of flexible balancing among great powers, enabling Vietnam to maintain its autonomy, avoid rigid alliances, and derive maximum benefit from cooperation with each power centre.

Geopolitical Context

The visit to Moscow was preceded by a trip to China and will be followed by a visit to France. This sequence is not merely a matter of protocol; it is a tangible projection of the policy line established at the 14th CPV Congress. Hanoi is constructing a system of mutual counterweights. Beijing is important as an anchor—ideologically aligned, historical, and economic; the West serves as a market and a source of investment and technological standards; and Paris acts as a European channel for diversification. In this system, Russia serves as a counter-balance. It does not replace other partners but enhances Vietnam’s bargaining power and reduces its dependence on any single centre.

It is significant for us that Vietnam’s current leader has considerable weight and authority. He heads both the party and the state; this marks the first state visit to Russia since 1991 by a leader holding both positions simultaneously. This underscores Russia’s importance in Hanoi’s strategy during the period Vietnam refers to as a “new era”. The visit represents a significant diplomatic push following the 14th National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the elections for the 16th National Assembly—a time when Vietnam had already renewed its leadership structure and was beginning to define its development priorities for the near future. From an economic perspective, a far more significant narrative lies beneath the surface of diplomatic protocol: Vietnam’s attempt to execute one of the most complex manoeuvres available to a developing economy—transitioning from the role of the global economy’s assembly line to that of a technological co-creator. 

Major Priorities

Vietnam has achieved tremendous success in economic development, transforming rapidly from an impoverished agrarian nation into one of Asia’s key manufacturing hubs. The country has integrated into the global economy primarily as a production base for multinational corporations. A low-cost yet relatively skilled workforce, political stability, a strategic geographic location, numerous free trade agreements, and an active policy of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) have enabled Vietnam to secure a vital position in Asian manufacturing supply chains.

Vietnam’s participation in global value chains (GVCs) can be called a “downstream” role—acting as a link that primarily imports intermediate goods, components, and technology for the subsequent processing and re-export of finished products.

However, this established model is beginning to hit its limits, while global economic turbulence creates an unpredictable environment and leaves the economy highly vulnerable. The more successful Vietnam becomes as an export hub, the more apparent becomes its dependence on foreign capital, imported components, and overseas technology. In 2025, enterprises owned and operated by Vietnamese investors accounted for only 22.7% of goods exports, whereas foreign-invested enterprises (FDI) generated 77.3%.   

The 14th Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) approved a strategic course aimed at accelerated modernisation, upgrading technology, and making the country’s economy more autonomous. According to To Lam, Vietnam is entering a new era—an era of building a peaceful, independent, wealthy, and prosperous nation with a modern industrial sector. This involves not merely accelerating the existing development model but achieving a qualitative shift toward greater sophistication. The country is set to transition from a model driven primarily by export-oriented manufacturing to a more complex economy based on domestically developed technology, human capital, and innovation. Science and technology have been designated as the primary pillars of this development, while transforming the growth model has been established as a direct and clearly defined objective.

By a decision of the Politburo of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) Central Committee dated December 22, 2024, a Central Steering Committee for the Development of Science, Technology, Innovation, and Digital Transformation was established. Initially led by General Secretary To Lam, the committee’s leadership later passed to Prime Minister Le Minh Khai, while retaining the heads of key ministries—Defence, Public Security, Finance, Planning and Investment, Education, and Foreign Affairs—as members. The very fact that a body at the highest political level is addressing the issue of pursuing scientific and technological breakthroughs indicates that Hanoi views technological transformation not merely as a sectoral task for a single ministry, but as a matter of national security and strategic survival in the new geoeconomic reality.

As it pursues this ambitious path, the country’s leadership is attaching great importance to international cooperation. Drawing on its own historical experience, Vietnam views peace not as an abstract political concept, but as a necessary condition for development. Over the past decades, the country has transitioned from devastating wars to the status of one of the world’s most dynamic economies, all without compromising its independent and autonomous foreign policy. For a state that has endured several destructive conflicts, this is a perfectly logical approach. Economic growth, investment, modernisation, and international integration require a stable external environment. Hence Hanoi’s interest in dialogue, international law, conflict prevention, and the creation of a non-discriminatory regional security architecture.

While international integration previously served primarily to create external conditions for national development, under To Lam, it is increasingly becoming one of the direct drivers of that development. International ties are intended to mobilise external resources for the restructuring of the economy, technological upgrades, and improving the quality of growth. In this sense, foreign policy is becoming directly integrated into the national development strategy. It is telling that in January 2025, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam enshrined active international integration as one of the country’s four strategic development priorities—alongside science, technology, innovation, and digital transformation, as well as institutional reform and private sector development. For Vietnam, this signifies a shift from the straightforward task of attracting foreign capital to the more complex challenge of managing international relations.

It is important to note that under To Lam, Vietnam’s multi-vector policy is taking on an increasingly pragmatic economic character. Hanoi is engaging with Washington, Beijing, Moscow, Seoul, Tokyo, and the European capitals not merely to demonstrate a foreign policy balance for its own sake, but to mobilise the resources essential for national development.

The Russian Factor

Vietnam’s multi-vector approach poses no obstacle to Russian-Vietnamese cooperation; on the contrary, it defines the framework for such collaboration. Hanoi is not seeking to replace one foreign partner with another; its goal is to expand its range of opportunities. Consequently, Russian proposals will be in demand not when they require a political choice between Moscow and Vietnam’s other partners, but when they offer access to additional technologies, investments, expertise, and market outlets. The more effectively Moscow integrates its initiatives into this existing network of external relations—rather than attempting to compete with it directly—the greater its opportunities for practical cooperation will be.

In this framework, Russia holds a special place among the partners with whom Hanoi pins its hopes for realising a new growth model. At a science and technology forum held in Moscow on September 9, 2026, President and General Secretary To Lam emphasised that the Vietnamese-Russian relationship in science and technology has stood the test of time. Tens of thousands of Vietnamese specialists were educated in the USSR, and the scientific-technological foundation of bilateral ties was established during the Soviet era. Today, he noted, it is the duty of both sides to elevate this legacy to a new stage of development, guided by a new mindset and moving beyond the traditional format of expert exchanges.

A key theme of the visit was the need to transform cooperation in strategic technologies into the cornerstone of bilateral relations. This specifically concerns the areas where 21st-century technological sovereignty is being forged: semiconductors, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity.

For Russia, this shift in focus offers an opportunity to move beyond traditional trade and play a more prominent role in the technological development of one of Southeast Asia’s most dynamic nations. Russia holds strong positions in a number of technology-intensive sectors—energy, science and education, digital technologies, space exploration, and the nuclear industry. Moreover, decades of Soviet and subsequently Russian fundamental and applied research have yielded a vast repository of patents, engineering designs, and academic research findings; a significant portion of them never reached the stage of mass-market commercial products—a classic example of the “valley of death” separating laboratory results from market-ready goods.

For Vietnam—which has an acute need for implementation-ready, mid- to high-value-added technological solutions—this Russian research base represents a valuable resource. With the right institutional framework, it can be transformed into joint manufacturing and innovation projects. For Hanoi, diversifying technology partners is becoming a way to reduce reliance on a single channel of technology transfer—namely, the subsidiaries of multinational corporations—and to establish alternative, more sovereign sources of expertise. Participation in large-scale projects to develop Vietnam’s economy can, in turn, boost the workload of Russian enterprises, generate demand for domestic technologies and expertise, and more deeply integrate Russia into the ASEAN economic landscape.

The human capital aspect is equally significant. Joint educational and technological initiatives can cultivate a new generation of Vietnamese specialists versed in Russian standards and technologies, thereby fostering not only immediate economic benefits but also long-term, high-quality ties. Active involvement in the development of Vietnam’s “new era” could also serve as a significant geopolitical asset for Moscow: demonstrating how a modern, technology-driven economy can be built with Russia—independent of the West—thereby strengthening its standing across the Global South.

Russian-Vietnamese cooperation holds significance beyond the bilateral dimension. Vietnam can act as a bridge between Russia and the broader Southeast Asian region, while Russia can leverage its established ties with Hanoi to expand dialogue between ASEAN and the EAEU, BRICS, and other multilateral frameworks in which Moscow has a strategic interest.

Key takeaways and objectives for Moscow and Hanoi

Political affinity and shared history do not, in themselves, create technology supply chains or trade flows. These require not only transport infrastructure but financial, information, and institutional infrastructure as well. This brings us to perhaps the central question of the current stage in Russian-Vietnamese relations: how do we move from a multitude of potential areas for cooperation to a select few projects that will actually be implemented. Recent experience demonstrates that while framework agreements are easily committed to paper, translating them into functioning mechanisms proves far more difficult.

We must recognise that our proposals will be valued as a means of bolstering Vietnam’s autonomy. The more consistently Russia acts as a provider of turnkey technological solutions, investments, expertise, and personnel—across sectors such as nuclear energy, semiconductors, AI, cybersecurity, and space—the more naturally it integrates into Hanoi’s multi-vector strategy. Conversely, attempting to compete with China, the US, or Europe for the status of primary partner would run counter to the very logic of Vietnam’s balancing act and narrow the scope for cooperation.

At the same time, To Lam’s “transit” visit to Moscow—sandwiched between stops in Beijing and Paris—also highlights the limits of Russian influence. Vietnam’s “multi-vector” foreign policy will not shift toward a pro-Russian stance; instead, it will remain a balancing act. It is no coincidence that To Lam is heading next to France, where Vietnam can also counterbalance Russian proposals in the nuclear and space sectors. Therefore, the key question for Moscow is not how to become Hanoi’s sole or primary partner, but how to establish itself as an indispensable element of Vietnam’s technological and infrastructural balance. If Russia can offer Vietnam what other power centres do not—such as joint manufacturing, technology transfer, the training of elite engineering personnel, and access to EAEU markets—then To Lam’s visit will evolve into a lasting channel for a Russian presence in Southeast Asia.

The answer to this question will determine whether To Lam’s visit to Moscow remains merely another chapter in a long history of mutual respect, or becomes the moment when the political capital accumulated over 75 years of diplomatic relations finally acquires a new, technological dimension.