Africa’s growth will be defined not so much by the volume of external resources as by the ability of the continent’s states to harness their own potential and to leverage international cooperation to advance national development. In this context, Russia can serve as a partner in strengthening the sovereignty of African nations by offering solutions that expand their capabilities rather than creating new forms of dependency, writes Andrey Maslov. This article was prepared specially for the 4th
African Conference of the Valdai Discussion Club.
Africa stands on the threshold of a new phase of economic growth, one rooted in stronger national sovereignty, the mobilisation of domestic resources, and the capacity to define development priorities independently. This commentary shows how the previous model—built largely on external financing and foreign investment—is giving way to a new agenda centred on energy, financial, food, and technological self-reliance.
A new era of accelerated growth for Africa?
The second half of the 2000s and the first half of the 2010s marked a period of surging global interest in Africa, characterised by an uptick in trade and investment as well as economic growth across the continent itself. A period of high commodity prices coincided with expanding markets and a growing recognition among global players of the advantages offered by Africa’s “demographic dividend.” China’s economic expansion occurred alongside debt-relief initiatives by Western institutions; meanwhile, the 2010 FIFA World Cup—the first to be held on the continent—further amplified global interest in Africa. During this period, Africa gained access to relatively affordable financing—not only through state-to-state channels (with many countries securing new loans) but also through foreign direct investment, which benefited from extensive incentives.
On the contrary, the last decade has been challenging for African economies: the rapid growth in imports that began in the mid-2000s gave way to stagnation or even decline. In 2016, lending from China to African nations reached its peak; around the same time, US companies moved away from new investments in the oil and gas sector of the Gulf of Guinea. Shale extraction technologies ensured a sufficient supply of hydrocarbons for the US domestic market for years to come, leading to a drop in imports from Africa. In short, the era of high global commodity prices that prevailed a decade ago came to an end. The situation for most African countries worsened in 2019 with the onset of the pandemic, which severely disrupted logistics chains; by 2022, new challenges had emerged in the form of sanctions and rising global prices for food and petroleum products.
Yet throughout this difficult decade, Africa has grown stronger and undergone significant transformation. As we reach the end of 2026, we may well be on the threshold of a new phase of growth—one that will encompass most of the continent’s nations, including its major economies. This new upswing will be fundamentally different from the one we witnessed nearly 20 years ago: it will be driven primarily by Africa’s own internal capacity. While competition for the continent’s resources—both natural and human—will persist and remain intense, it will play only a secondary role.
The driving mechanisms of growth in Africa are shifting. Today, the primary sources of new investment are found within the continent itself: in national budgets, the African private sector, and local banking systems. Among external sources, the role of diasporas remains significant—and continues to grow—while foreign aid, loans, and direct investment from international corporations serve as supplements to domestic resources, including at the level of individual projects. The shift in the centre of gravity within the structure of economic growth has taken some time. The last decade has been characterised by a gradual decline in the availability of external financing alongside the strengthening of domestic institutions across Africa, both public and private.
The value and cost of sovereignty
It is hardly surprising that the concept of state and national sovereignty—and its inherent value—has moved to the forefront of political discourse and the broader information landscape. Most states have come to view sovereignty as both a value in itself and a necessary prerequisite for continued economic development and growth. An increasing number of leaders are highlighting its importance, and it has become a key unifying element in strategic planning documents and development agendas.
We define sovereignty not as a rejection of external ties but as a country’s capacity to manage its external relations and dependencies independently—leveraging them to foster its own development and to serve the interests, well-being, and security of its own population.
It can be argued that sovereignty is born at the moment it is declared, but it subsequently grows and accumulates, increasing in structural complexity. Sovereignty acquires new dimensions: sovereignty in the realms of defence and security, finance, energy, food, and information. Each of these, in turn, consists of numerous components, the development of which involves not only the state but also a wide range of domestic stakeholders. External partners may also participate in the construction of sovereignty.
Every component of sovereignty comes at a price; it entails costs and investments—not all of which must necessarily be borne by the state. For instance, while a nation could store its citizens’ data on foreign infrastructure, it could also choose to build its own. In such projects, the state’s primary role is to define the strategic, legislative, and regulatory frameworks. Funding, however, can be sourced from the state, through public-private partnerships, or even—to a limited extent—from foreign entities, provided that the governing frameworks are defined with particular rigour.
Sovereignty cannot be purchased or imported as a ready-made solution; it must be built internally, according to one’s own blueprints—even if those blueprints incorporate imported components. This principle is increasingly becoming the cornerstone of strategic planning for many African nations across a broad spectrum of sectors.
A country’s development can be viewed as a series of investment decisions and projects: the construction of a data centre, an educational or medical facility, or a power plant designed to supply the population and industry—all of these represent investments in sovereignty. While the sources of funding may vary, the state retains the authority to set the rules, priorities, and strategies.
A new agenda
This new vision also necessitates adjustments to traditional approaches to key development challenges and issues.
For example, an increasing number of countries are prioritising projects aimed at securing a reliable supply of electricity for their own economies. Attracting foreign investment is increasingly less likely to be viewed as a value in itself (local investors should not face worse conditions than their foreign counterparts).
High birth rates are increasingly seen not as a problem—a perspective often imposed from the outside—but as a key advantage for African nations, one that can and should be leveraged to set them on a path toward sustainable growth.
Responsibility for the state and the preservation of ecosystems should lie primarily with national governments. While it is important to protect ecosystems, this should not come at the expense of people or the development interests of national economies. Functions related to environmental and technical monitoring should be shifted to the national level (which requires both the necessary technical capacity and a robust regulatory framework). Only once national agencies have been strengthened does it make sense to coordinate their efforts at the regional or international level. International organisations should not be the ones to decide whether priority should be given to industrial development or environmental conservation; such decisions—as well as the development of relevant criteria and recommendations and the collection of pertinent data—must fall squarely within the purview of national authorities, which act in the interests of their own citizens and populations.
This represents a new, sovereign agenda for Africa, and the list of such points could be extended further. These shifting approaches also encompass sectors such as education, healthcare, infrastructure, and other foundational areas of the economy.
The political struggle for Africa
Does Russia seek to strengthen its own influence in Africa by weakening the position of the West? This is a common way of framing the issue, but it is incorrect. Among observers and in the media, one often encounters the view of Africa as a game board where a zero-sum contest plays out between Russia or China and the West: if Russia occupies a certain “square,” that square is denied to its adversaries; conversely, if the West withdraws from a position, it is seen as a gain for China or Russia. However, anyone with real-world experience in Africa knows this is not the case. Many of Russia’s friends and partners seek to develop relations with both Russia and the West—an intention they do not hide—and Russia never reproaches its partners for their desire to broaden their external ties.
The multi-vector, balanced political orientation adopted by most African nations aligns perfectly with Russia’s long-term interests. The more connections our partners maintain, the more rapidly their economic and political strength will grow, and the more independent they will become in their decision-making. This is entirely to Russia’s benefit, as we seek a mutually advantageous, equitable partnership with Africa—not the creation of “spheres of influence” on the continent, which would imply a Russian presence that limits the sovereignty of our partner nations.
When a country—as it is becoming increasingly common—declares that partnership with Russia is a priority, or when a head of state chooses our country for their first official visit, what does this signify? What obligations does such a close relationship impose on both us and our partner? In this regard, the Russian approach may differ significantly from that of our European opponents.
Russia has an interest in a more independent Africa, with states that are as strong and autonomous as possible. This autonomy also entails the ability to rely on robust regional alliances and unions—for instance, we in Russia view with great warmth and welcome the recent steps taken toward one another by the Alliance of Sahel States and Algeria, both of which are important partners of ours. A balanced, multi-vector foreign policy is a cornerstone and an essential characteristic of any sovereign state; ultimately, the more African nations that pursue such a policy, the better it is for us in Russia.
Historically, the Russian approach to Africa has been distinguished by the complete absence of a colonial framework or agenda. It entails no desire to reshape partners in our own image or to make them conform to us; rather, it is rooted in respect for the values and unique internal structures of each nation, as well as for their chosen path of development.
At the 3rd Russia-Africa Summit held in Moscow on October 28–29, 2026, Vladimir Putin presented a “Platform for Sovereign Development” to African leaders. The platform included a tangible, practical component: an exhibition showcasing various solutions, each designed to strengthen a nation’s state sovereignty in one dimension or another. These solutions can contribute to building the sovereignty of an African nation; however, adopting them does not in any way imply the creation of a one-sided or insurmountable dependence on Russia. A partner state is fully capable of controlling these solutions and developing them independently, thereby assembling its own platform for sovereign development. In our assessment, this very approach resonated with and sparked interest among not only the leaders who attended the summit and forum in Moscow but also the majority of the event’s participants.
The Valdai Discussion Club was established in 2004. It is named after Lake Valdai, which is located close to Veliky Novgorod, where the Club’s first meeting took place.
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